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Business cycle theories based on incomplete information start from the premise that key eco-
nomic decisions on pricing, investment or production are often made on the basis of incomplete
knowledge of constantly changing aggregate economic conditions. As a result, decisions tend to
respond slowly to changes in economic fundamentals, and small or temporary economic shocks may
have large and long-lasting eﬀects on macroeconomic aggregates.
Incomplete information theories have been popular in particular for explaining sluggish price or
wage adjustment in response to monetary shocks. At the heart of this theory lies the assumption
that ﬁrms or households only pay attention to a relatively small number of indicators regarding
conditions in markets relevant to their own activities, but they may not acquire information more
broadly about aggregate economic activity. With imprecise information about these aggregate
conditions, it takes the ﬁrms some time to sort out temporary from permanent changes, or nominal
from real disturbances. Prices then respond with a delay to changes in nominal spending, and
monetary shocks may have signiﬁcant eﬀects on real economic activity in the intervening periods -
despite the fact that ﬁrms have the opportunity to constantly readjust their decisions.
This basic idea was proposed ﬁrst by Phelps (1970) and formalized by Lucas (1972). In Lucas
(1972), economic agents produce in localized markets, in which they observe the market-clearing
price at which they can sell their output. This price is aﬀected both by aggregate spending shocks
and by market-speciﬁc supply shocks. Under perfect information, quantities adjust in response
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1to local supply shocks, but not prices, and prices respond to aggregate spending shocks, but not
quantities. With imperfect information, agents are unable to ﬁlter out the magnitudes of the
aggregate and market-speciﬁc shocks from the observed prices in the short-run. Output then
responds positively to price changes and spending shocks in the short run, but not in the long run,
once agents have been able to sort out the spending shocks from the market-speciﬁc supply shocks.
Lucas (1972) formulated this idea in a rational expectations market equilibrium model, in which
agents’ expectations are fully Bayesian, and the resulting output responses are optimal. His model
also includes stark assumptions about the nature of local vs. aggregate market interactions, as well
as the nature of shocks (monetary vs. real, demand vs. supply, aggregate vs. market-speciﬁc) and
the information to which ﬁrms have access.
Importantly, the model lacks a natural internal ampliﬁcation mechanism: the extent of incom-
plete nominal adjustment depends almost entirely on the degree of informational incompleteness.
Subsequent work has tried to address these issues, for example by introducing richer information
structures. Townsend (1983) considers an investment model, in which ﬁrms get to observe how much
some of the other ﬁrms invest. Therefore, they need to form forecasts about each others’ beliefs -
forecasting the forecasts of others. This leads to a complicated inﬁnite regress problem, whereby a
ﬁrm’s current investment level depends on its observation of other ﬁrms’ past investment, which in
turn depended on observations about past investment... Townsend showed that this type of prob-
lem does not admit a simple ﬁnite-dimensional recursive structure. As a result, ﬁrms must draw
inference about all past realizations of shocks simultaneously, leading to an inﬁnite-dimensional
ﬁltering and ﬁxed point problem, with no easily characterized solution.
These and other important technical and computational hurdles eﬀectively imposed limitations
on the complexity and economic realism of the early incomplete information models. Moreover,
the model is open to the criticism that if incomplete information is a major source of business
cycle ﬂuctuations, then there seems to be an important societal beneﬁtt om a k i n gt h er e l e v a n t
information publicly available to everyone. In part because of these diﬃculties, economists have,
from the mid-eighties, turned their attention to New Keynesian sticky price theories that emphasize
the role of adjustment and coordination frictions in price-setting.1
Recently, the incomplete information theories have made a comeback, which can be traced to
two factors. First, technological progress has made models such as Townsend (1983) computa-
tionally tractable. Second, new game-theoretic results regarding equilibrium analysis with a lack
of common knowledge and heterogeneity in beliefs, as well as insights borrowed from the sticky
1among others, see Calvo (1983), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1989).
2price literature regarding the role of real rigidities and pricing complementarities (Ball and Romer
(1990) have enabled us to paint a much richer picture of the adjustment dynamics resulting from
incomplete information models. The empirical performance of these new incomplete information
models, however, still remains to be seen.
In the remainder of this essay I provide a uniﬁed exposition of the main ideas behind the
incomplete information theories, from the original contributions to the more recent renewal. I also
attempt to chart out some of the challenges that lie ahead. This is a lively and active area of
research, with many open questions and few deﬁnite answers.
1 A canonical framework
Consider the following model, which is based on the New Keynesian models of monopolistic com-
petition. There is a large number of ﬁrms, indexed by i ∈ [0,1].I ne a c hp e r i o d ,e a c hﬁrm sets its







,w h e r eIi
t denotes
the information set of ﬁrm i at date t, i.e. all signals on which it can condition its pricing decision.
p∗
t is characterized as
p∗
t = kyt + pt,( 1 )
where pt =
R
pt (i)di denotes the average of the ﬁrms’ pricing decisions, yt denotes the aggregate
real output in period t, relative to its trend level that would prevail with complete information,
and k>0 measures the response of optimal pricing decisions to real output. A ﬁrm’s ideal relative
price p∗
t − pt is determined by real output deviations from trend.
We augment this pricing rule by a quantity equation, yt + pt = mt,w h e r emt denotes nominal
spending. Combining the two, we ﬁnd
p∗
t = kmt +( 1− k)pt (2)
Nominal spending mt is driven by exogenous shocks, for simplicity, assume that mt = mt−1 + εt,
where {εt} is iid white noise.
Each ﬁrm’s target price is therefore a linear combination of the exogenous shocks and the prices
set by the other ﬁrms. If k ∈ (0,1), prices are complementary, i.e. an increase in the average
price level implies that each ﬁrm has an incentive to raise its own price. The parameter value of
k depends on the substitution elasticity between the ﬁrms’ products, the ﬁrms’ returns to scale
parameter in the technology, and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
To complete the model description, we need to specify each ﬁrm’s information set Ii
t -t h i si s
where diﬀerent incomplete information theories vary. An equilibrium of this model requires that






, taking into account that p∗
t itself depends
on the aggregate price level.
Common Information: Suppose ﬁrst that all ﬁrms have identical information sets - Ii
t = It.
Then, they will set identical prices, equal to pt (i)=pt = E (mt|It).T h i sr e ﬂects the implications
of the original Lucas model that prices adjust to the common expectation of the underlying shocks.
When information is incomplete, ﬁrms will only learn gradually about mt, prices adjust slowly,
and monetary surprises have real eﬀects: yt is determined directly by the discrepancy between
the realized and the expected value of mt. However, if the available information on which these
expectations are based is suﬃciently precise, then E (mt|It) cannot be far from the true value of mt.
As discussed above, the real eﬀects of monetary shocks are bounded by the degree of informational
incompleteness - as ﬁrms have better information, their prices track mt more closely, and monetary
shocks have smaller real eﬀects.
Heterogeneous beliefs, but independent strategies: A similar conclusion emerges when
ﬁrms have diﬀerent information sets, but their target prices do not respond to the other ﬁrms’













di of the spending shock. Once again, if ﬁrms are suﬃciently well informed, their
pricing decisions will on average not be far from the nominal spending shock, which implies little
delay in price adjustment and only small real output eﬀects.
Heterogeneous beliefs and complementary strategies: Suppose now that instead k ∈
(0,1), so that there are complementarities in pricing decisions. Averaging the pricing equation, and













(s) (mt) denotes the s-order average expectation of mt, or the average expectation of the
average expectation of ... (repeat s times) ... of mt.Aﬁrm’s optimal price is therefore given as a
geometrically weighted average of higher-order expectations - a ﬁrm needs to forecast not only the
realized shock, but also the other ﬁrms’ expectations of the shock, the other ﬁrms’ expectations of
the other ﬁrms’ expectations of the shock, and so on.
If the ﬁrms all had identical information, the Law of Iterated Expectations would simply collapse
the right-hand side above into the common ﬁrst-order expectation of mt. The model thus derives
4its interest from the fact that with heterogeneous information, higher-order expectations respond
diﬀerently to new information than ﬁrst-order expectations about mt.
The following example illustrates this point and serves also to derive the main results of this
model. Suppose that all ﬁrms observe mt−1 exactly, but only a fraction λ (the informed)g e t s
to observe mt. Then, E (mt)=λmt +( 1− λ)mt−1, but the second order average expectation
is E
(2) (mt)=λ[λmt +( 1− λ)mt−1]+( 1− λ)mt−1 = λ2mt +
¡
1 − λ2¢
mt−1. By iteration, the
s-order average expectation of mt is E








1 − (1 − k)λ
(mt − mt−1). (4)
Two important conclusions emerge. First, note that kλ
1−(1−k)λ <λ .T h ei n f o r m e dﬁrms whose
prices may react to mt take into account that the uninformed ﬁrms won’t respond, which in turn
reduces their incentives to adjust prices. Therefore, while incomplete information serves as the
initial source of sluggish price adjustment, the complementarity and the heterogeneity in beliefs
dampen the response of prices far beyond what the initial degree of informational incompleteness
would suggest. To illustrate the strength of this ampliﬁcation eﬀect, consider the following numeri-
cal example: suppose that k =0 .15 (as in standard parametrizations of New Keynesian sticky price
models), and that half the ﬁrms are informed. Then, the contemporaneous response of average
prices is kλ
1−(1−k)λ ≈ 0.13,i . e .a1% increase in nominal spending leads to only a 0.13% increase in
prices, and a 0.87% increase in real output - despite the fact that half of the ﬁrms actually observe
the increase in nominal spending and are hence able to respond to it!
Second, this ampliﬁcation can be large, even if the degree of informational incompleteness is
small. If λ is close to 1, almost all ﬁrms exactly observe the current realization mt. Nevertheless,
if k is close to 0, i.e. if there is a strong pricing complementarity, they still won’t respond to the
monetary shock. The presence of only a few uninformed ﬁrms is therefore enough to radically
overturn the conclusions of the complete information model.
These two observations apply quite generally, once ﬁrms have heterogeneous beliefs. They form
the central insight of the new incomplete information theories. In Mankiw and Reis (2002), hetero-
geneous beliefs result because in any given period, only a fraction of ﬁrms observe new information.
This generalizes the above example to allow for richer adjustment dynamics. In Woodford (2002),
all ﬁrms observe a conditionally independent idiosyncratic signal xi
t of the current realization of mt
in each period. The resulting inference problem is more complicated but can be solved numerically.
Again, the response of prices to monetary shocks is signiﬁcantly dampened by the fact that ﬁrms
do not share in common information, yet their pricing decisions are complementary.
5The role of public information: Hellwig (2002) provides a simpliﬁed version of Woodford
(2002), providing closed-form solutions to a general class of information structures. This simpliﬁed
model also accommodates the presence of additional public sources of information such as central
bank announcements. Besides dampening the response to idiosyncratic private signals, the com-
plementarity in prices generates overreaction to public news. Public announcements thus speed
up price adjustment and reduce the real eﬀects of monetary shocks, but the noise in public news
creates an additional source of volatility, which in some cases may increase rather than decrease
real output ﬂuctuations.2
2L o o k i n g a h e a d
These new contributions have provided promising insights into the ampliﬁcation and propagation
mechanisms of incomplete information models. But they also abstract from important modeling
issues that need to be addressed before a comprehensive quantitative evaluation becomes possible.
So far, much of the analysis is based on a stylized price-setting model that captures the essence
of pricing complementarities as described above, without deriving them within a fully speciﬁed
dynamic general equilibrium model. This short-cut is not without problems. First, the lack of a
proper context of markets makes it diﬃcult to interpret these propagation results. Presumably
in a market ﬁrms obtain some information about price and quantity variables - so far, this is not
formally modelled.
Second, the assumption that ﬁrms are heterogeneously informed implies that other frictions
must be present - in particular, the extent to which information about fundamental shocks can be
inferred from publicly observable prices must be limited, implying that the asset market must be
incomplete. But then, one faces the problem of isolating the eﬀects of informational heterogeneity
from the eﬀects of other market imperfections.3
Third, there is an issue of interpretation. At this point, there exist several diﬀerent interpreta-
tions regarding the source of the diﬀerences in beliefs across ﬁrms, and they may lead to radically
diﬀerent model conclusions. In Mankiw and Reis (2002), ﬁrms update their information only infre-
quently, and in the intervening periods set prices on the basis of outdated information; Reis (2006)
further develops this idea on the basis of menu costs in updating decisions. Woodford (2002)
2Similar results are derived by Amato and Shin (2003) for Woodford’s model, and by Ui (2003) in the original
Lucas island model.
3In Lorenzoni (2005), for instance, heterogeneous information coexists with market incompleteness, which creates
an additional precautionary savings motive.
6instead bases his model on the notion of ‘rational inattention’, developed by Sims (2003, 2006).
Sims argues that decision makers only have a ﬁnite capacity to process new information, which
constrains the quality of the signals they observe in any given period. Heterogeneity in beliefs then
arises naturally through the idiosyncratic noise in each individuals information processing channel.
A third interpretation suggests that individuals are Bayesian, but access to information is limited -
for example, ﬁrms observe the demand for their own products, but not the demand for competitors’
products. If each ﬁrm is subject to idiosyncratic, as well as common shocks, then an information
structure much like the above with idiosyncratic private signals emerges. On the other hand, ﬁrms
also observe market prices, which generates a source of common information.
Finally, all these models treat the information structure as an exogenous primitive. In real-
ity, ﬁrms and households have access to overwhelming amounts of information, and information
processing becomes a matter of choice, given the existing constraints and trade-oﬀs. By and large,
the eﬀects of information costs and choices and the strategic interaction that results from these
choices remains unexplored.4
In summary, the most important issue that remains to be resolved is the grounding of new
incomplete information theories within a fully speciﬁe dm o d e lo fg o o d sa n da s s e tm a r k e t s ,w i t h
special emphasis on the origins of the informational frictions. Beyond that, the new incomplete
information theories raise many intriguing questions, which merit further attention, or have already
been addressed to some extent: for example, Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005) reconsider the role of
monetary policy, and Morris and Shin (2002), Hellwig (2005) and Angeletos and Pavan (2004, 2005)
discuss the welfare eﬀects of information disclosures. Finally, the combination of new evidence
on the cross-sectional and business cycle properties of expectations (Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers,
2004) and new micro-level data on price adjustments (Bils and Klenow, 2004) promises to provide
an interesting avenue for evaluating the empirical performance of the model’s cross-sectional and
business cycle implications.
4For some preliminary developments in this direction, see Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2005), and Hellwig and
Veldkamp (2005). In Mackowiak and Wiederholt, ﬁrms need to allocate a ﬁxed processing capacity between idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate variables. Hellwig and Veldkamp explore how the pricing complementarities that drive business
cycle implications lead to coordination motives and multiple equilibria in information acquisition.
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